I’ve come to enjoy the program Justice with Harvard University professor Michael Sandel. I recommend you watch it some time! In episode 6b he discusses Immanuel Kant’s assertion that a deed is moral only when the motive is pure. For example, if a shop owner could give a customer the wrong change but doesn’t because he fears being caught (something that would harm the business) this action is not “moral” because his motive was not pure. If he gives correct change because it is the right thing to do then it is moral. Another example would be a man remains faithful to his marriage because he fears if he cheats he would be caught (i.e. the consequence is the motivation) is not the same as the man who remains faithful because he believes it is the right thing to do.
What do you say? Is the morality of an action determined by the action or by the motivation for the action?
the archives near Emmaus 
Does it have to be one or the other? For example, couldn’t the fear of a consequence be a mechanism by which humans recognize what is intrinsically right? I wonder if it doesn’t divide as cleanly as we might want. Or, another way to say, is there ever a 100% alteuistic act?
@Jason:
Good observation. It does seem to assume that it is possible to be altruistic and this is obviously debatable.
I’m stumped…. what else is new.
If I were to disagree with Kant (morality is determined by the action), then I buy into this whole legalistic system that I came from, that is focused on behavior modification. If I say agree (morality is determined by intent), them I realize all the horrible immorality at work in my heart.
Like Jason alluded to above, the idea of morality may be larger than we are perceiving it to be.
Enough of the thought-provoking posts today. My input hardly tells the story of how much I’ve been working through the last two posts.
@Jason— This depends on what you mean by consequences here. Two reasons why 1) If fear of a consequence is an intrinsic determiner for what is morally right, what do we do about ‘the morally right’ actions that have bad consequences that we all might fear? Or if, lets say, an evil regime attaches negative consequences to morally right actions; which at that point we would quite naturally fear. 2) If you mean a theory like John Stuart Mill/Jeremy Bentham: Consequentialism (utilitarianism); where an action is morally right if and only if the good of the consequence outweighs the bad. You then run into another set of problems— For example, taking my evil regime analogy above: it could be morally acceptable to provide negative consequences towards morally correct actions if doing so means the greater good. Or a different analogy, Robin Hood’s stealing from the rich to give to the poor would be morally correct as it has the greatest amount of good.
@All— Kant is saying here that an action is right when it is actually right to do that action; no matter the consequences. What this means is that it is right to, to borrow from a previous debate, ‘to love thy enemy as thyself’ even if the consequence means you or your family dies. The negative side of Kant’s position would be in cases like the famous wife killer analogy—where the wife fearing her husband comes to you and you allow her to hide in your house. The husband comes over and asks if his wife is here, and you by your duty to tell the truth, tell him that she is. He will then proceed to kill her. Kant would say that it is not your responsibility that she was murdered, as it was your duty to tell the truth (to lie takes away his free will in the matter). To say lying is acceptable in this case, that would lean more towards consequentialism.
@James W.—-There are other options, another option could be Gandhi’s theory; which is a combination of deontology and consequentialism ( or Utilitarianism)— His theory has to do with one’s duty to one’s village, and if this is done at the local level, it will help the greatest amount of people (the entire world). A Christian version I am personally working on might be something like this, if everyone just loved their neighbor as themselves (Christian duty) then this would lead to the greatest amount of good (the entire world’s survival). It is consequentialistic in many ways, because one is supposed to perform one’s duty in such a manner, that they are to love their neighbor, even if their neighbor does not return the love.
@James: It left me a bit stumped as well.
@Barobin: Great contributing comments. I am interesting in how your Christian duty hypothesis is developing.
@Barobin – good thoughts. I did mean, just as an example, that fear of consequences (like Brian used in his post) could be A mechanism, not necessarily THE mechanism that can help us know what’s right. Nor am I advocating a utilitarian “ends justify the means” approach. Just trying to say that it’s more comple than the dichotomy that tries to distinguish motives and actions, because those two are intertwined most of the time. Not that I’m well versed in ethics by any stretch of the imagination…
Where does this leave the character of God as that which determines what is moral, and what isn’t. Is there a standard apart from Him?
@James: Kant does not say that actions springing from fear are immoral or in any sense bad. They’re just not judgments of morality – they’re judgments from prudence. Action from fear is good if it prolongs life, health and happiness, but it’s an animal reaction (something any smart dog or cat would do) and therefore lies outside the family of strictly responsible human moral action as Kant wants to define it. So it is not immoral but simply non-moral. Action from fear can even be something a very prudent or even wise man might do from common sense, but it provides no basis for the kind of post-animal human morality Kant is talking about.
People that are ‘being good’ following Bible rules simply from fear of hell or desire for reward may still hope that in God’s mercy they may be saved even though none of their behavior is based in a motive that merits the reward of true morality which Kant talks about. Better if God is loved for himself alone and not as a means to an end.
@Barobin: I think that whole ‘cannot tell a lie’ thing is a parody of Kant. Same with your example that Kant would have us love our enemy even if it means he will kill our families. Do your examples come from Kant’s own books? Which of his books did you read? What (or who) makes you think Kant is so easy to refute?
I do not know enough about Kant to respond to him in whole. However, I love what you have quoted from him on this subject. However, I hope he does not claim originality on this point as he has merely borrowed the ethic Jesus taught in the Sermon on the Mount, though he depersonalized it in the process. I prefer Jesus’ version, for He makes clear that “what is right = what is pleasing in His sight.”
@Brian— I’ll let you know after I read some Gandhi; his combination of deontology and utilitarianism maybe what I need to unpack the ideas I have floating in my head. At this point I’m trying to allow for ‘enemy love’ as the Christian moral duty, and in the consequentialist sense, I am trying to figure out what could be an appropriate end without upsetting the ‘Christian moral duty,’ I want to adopt.
@Jason— I would echo the animal instincts idea that John stated. However, as you postulate, the morally correct thing to do could come out negative consequences. Parents raise their children using consequences to keep them from doing the bad things; but we should not leave it there— we as a community, especially a Christian one, need to bring ‘right behavior’ past the threshold of fearing hell and law, and into something about loving God. We tend to leave it at the selfish end: Fearing hell and fearing jail.
@John— With regards to the parody, you must be mixing Kant up with George Washington’s myth of cutting down the cherry tree :). I have indeed read some of Kant’s works,—whether I, or anyone else completely understands him is another thing. The part about lying is actually from his work entitled: ON A SUPPOSED RIGHT TO LIE BECAUSE OF PHILANTHROPIC CONCERNS. It was not my intention to ‘refute’ Kant; rather, I repeated what Kant himself had stated. I did say that it was ‘negative’ though, and that was because it seems contrary to what we would want to do in that situation (just think Diary of Ann Frank). As far as the ‘love your enemy’ piece, I am not sure if Kant states that exactly as such. However in his work entitled ‘Metaphysics of Morals,’ he sort of alludes to enemy love in the Bible as being a sort of beneficence, and not just an emotion (since you cannot command those).I’d have to work out more of what he was saying in that small section to see if he was implying a biblical enemy love theory. Also, I did not mean to imply Kant stated those words, I was merely pointing out that ‘if it were ones duty’ to practice that sort of enemy love, it would have to be practiced even in circumstances of your family being killed (I forgot the ‘if’); because, deontology does not take into account the cost of the consequences. I was tying it into a broader picture of Christian ethics and Christian deontology: is it our duty to love thy enemies even in the face of not just personal danger, but the danger of those we love?
@Barobin “‘enemy love’ as the Christian moral duty” makes a certain amount of sense but ‘what it means to love’ needs to be unpacked a bit, as Brian’s previous post tried to do.
Do we love our ‘enemy’s sin as part of loving them? Do we love our enemy’s perspective as part of loving them? What does it mean to love our enemies apart from their sin or sinful ideas.
One example, for example might be Gandhi. Gandhi exhibited a great love for humanity, but refuted Christ in saying all religions are ‘true’, are of equal worth, and ultimately should be humanistic (Quoting Qandhi “The need of the moment is not One Religion, but mutual respect and tolerance of the devotees of the different religions. We want to reach not the dead level, but unity in diversity. The Soul of religion is One but it is encased a multitude of forms. Truth is the exclusive property of no single scriptures.”)
If Gandhi held ideas Christ would have rejected, what do we do with that (in a practical sense) to meet our obligation to love our enemies?
@Barobin: Thank you. I know the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and the critique of Practical Reason pretty well, but not so much the later book on Morals. I do own a copy however, and will take a look (I have other books to read, would it be easy for you to point me to the place you mention?).
I’ll check out the essay on ‘The supposed right to lie’ – my feeling is that he gives himself an out somewhere in the book. 🙂
I don’t want to appear to be saying Kant is above criticism. In fact, his appreciation of religion was not his strong suit, but I think it was quite a bit above the level of many others who pass (even now) for pious.
We shouldn’t forget that the Good Samaritan parable switches the role of perceived enemies to that of neighbor (in Christian love) – “Love your neighbor as you love yourself.” If we can conceive of our enemy as ‘neighbor’ we take the problem out of the level of simply becoming a willing doormat to evil aggressors.
@Andrew T.— Well… if we are talking about ‘enemy love,’ we are talking about a person, one’s enemy (all ‘enemy’ is, is a qualifier for a person). If we start talking about whether or not we love their ideas or actions, that is quite a different question to answer. So, I can love my enemy without loving his ideas or actions. Just like I can love my friends without loving their ideas or actions. Enemy love should be reflected in the person of Christ; who probably did not like the idea of having to go before a rigged trial, subjugating himself to the decisions of the Jewish Sanhedrin, nor Pilate’s attempt to wash his hands of the situation, and of course he probably did not like the action of being nailed to a cross. However, he did so because he loved his enemies….and the ol’ adage comes into play here, wwjd? We know what he would do in the case of his enemies, he’d lay his life down for them.
@John— I don’t think he gives himself an out on this one; let me know if you find one. I like Kant a lot, he is ridiculously sophisticated, but I wouldn’t say I am a Kantian by any means :).