In the second debate between Craig A. Evans and Bart D. Ehrman (see “Ehrman-Evans 2012 debates”) Evans was asked about the miraculous as relates to doing history. The question was framed in such as way as to discover whether or not Evans is consistent when he reads claims about miracles in ancient literature. In other words, does he accept Christian claims while denying others? If so, why?
Well, Evans does give miracles a fair hearing even in literature not related to Judaism/Christianity. He noted that one of his presuppositions is theism. Although he is a Christian theist he does not deny the possibility of miraculous actions in history. Of course, Ehrman’s agnosticism makes him very skeptical to such reports if not completely closed to them.
I feel the same way. If I read an account where something “miraculous” took place I don’t know that I automatically agree that the interpretation of the event demands divine intervention (or the intervention of unseen forces like spirits, angels, or demons), but I am not closed to the possibility. I did come into Christianity through Pentecostalism!
That said, I wonder if we should leave room in our historiography for complete affirmation or denial of miraculous events. In other words, do I believe Jesus healed a blind man and raised some dead people? Yes. Do I think we can verify this historically? I’m not sure.
Remember, there are people present in some narratives where Jesus does the miraculous and they attribute it the work of Beelzebub. The event happens, some see a miracle of God, some see a work of Satan. I think historiography allows us to admit this before we make the next step where we say what we subjectively think about the event.
What can we verify? We can suggest that there is a strong probability that followers of Jesus saw him do things that they could not explain that they attributed to the work of God. This is an interpretation of the events though. At best, we know Jesus did enough to cause people to see him as a miracle worker. I don’t know if doing history allows one to makes claims that God did this or that.
Does this mean one cannot strongly believe that God did do this or that? Of course not! When we do history and construct histories we cannot do it without our presuppositions and worldviews bleeding into our historiography. Eventually all history moves from the data to interpretations of the data to a narrative constructed around that interpretation.
If someone is not a Christian they will likely say (data) people believed that Jesus healed a blind man, but (interpretation) there is likely some natural explanation or mythology developed based on crowd hype, therefore (narrative) we have a Jesus who was a perceived miracle worker though we “know” no one can do those things.
On the other hand a Christian see the data but (interpretation) it was a work of God like the Evangelists interpreted it to be and therefore (narrative) Jesus’ miracles prove A,B, and C about him.
At the end of the day history is not a science. It isn’t just an art either, but it may come closer to the latter than the former. Eventually our “histories” are interpretations of the data. We “know” things to some extent (I appreciate the insights of critical realists), but we use a subjective lens.
the archives near Emmaus 
Though healings and exorcisms don’t necessarily have to be classified as miraculous at all (whether by historians or anthropologists etc, or even Gospel writers)…
@James:
Very true, there can be attempts at more natural explanations that don’t need to be classified as “miracles”.
We can’t necessarily verify *anything* in a past testimony, miraculous or otherwise. It’s natural to react incredulously against claims which seem supernatural, but it’s equally impossible to verify whether such a thing did or did not occur.
As I commented below post #1 in this series, this is why we need to move further away from arguing over historicity, and further towards hypothetical reconstructions. It’s fine to say “I believe it” but then, what precise belief is it which the text actually supports?
In some ways this has already begun. Debating the *nature* of Jesus’ “resurrection” is becoming more popular than debating the “facts” over whether it happened. Frankly, that’s also not my favorite debate, but it’s at least well known, and probably a fair example of how things are shifting.
A primary step in historiography can be authentication, but that isn’t the primary goal.
When fully and properly functioning, the primary goal of historiography is reconstruction.
@Bill:
Very true, and I think many people want to avoid this reality, but it is inevitable.
inevitable… Mister Anderson.
It is indeed.
I think history *is* science. Yes, it’s different from physics, but when you say that <> I affirm that *any science* is interpretation of the data (and physics makes no exception).
History is not art, cause it adopts a scientific method to evaluate sources and witnesses, and produces results that pass thru a critical review process and improve knowledge. Of course history has to deal with contingency (this happens also with biology science, think about evolution theory) much more than physics, and its results can only be measured in “degree of probability”. But this is also true for physics and any other empirical science, although the “degree of probability ” is higher.
uh, my quote on the first line has been dropped. It was: “when you say that ‘Eventually our “histories” are interpretations of the data’ I affirm that…” etc.
@Talita:
I see your point, but I think the transition from data to interpretation is where it morphs a bit. You are right to notice it mimics the sciences in much of its methodology, and the interpretive process can be similar to many forms of science, but I think the work of history is artistic once it comes to the storytelling side of things.
We can suggest that there is a strong probability that followers of Jesus saw him do things that they could not explain that they attributed to the work of God. This is an interpretation of the events though. At best, we know Jesus did enough to cause people to see him as a miracle worker.
Even this seems to me to be too strong a statement given the evidence. It seems to me that we have plenty of reason to think that the overwhelming majority of supernatural tales are the product of human foibles like gullibility, wishful thinking, prevarication, superstition, and exaggeration. We have plenty of examples of people inventing stories about revered people in order to make them seem larger than life. It might be that Jesus did something that caused people to see him as a miracle worker, but I don’t think we can deem that probable rather than merely possible in a historical sense. At best, we know that by forty years or so after his death, some people understood him to have been a miracle worker.
@Vinny:
It is possible that stories were invented. Even then we have a Jesus who is remembered as doing these things and doing them frequently. Even E.P. Sanders lists “healings and exorcisims” as one of the things we can know confidently about the historical Jesus. This doesn’t mean that we can verify a sickness was healed or a demon expelled, but it seems to be a sure part of his reputation.
Brian,
Ronald Reagan is remembered by many people as a deficit hawk who cut the size of government and opposed all tax increases, but it isn’t true. I think we can find plenty of historical examples of people who gained a reputation for doing things they never actually did within decades of their deaths because it served someone else’s purposes to have the person remembered that way.. I think it plausible that people who knew the historical Jesus remembered him as doing those things, but I don’t see how Sanders gets to “knowing confidently” that the stories weren’t invented later by people who didn’t know him.
Vinny,
I guess this is further proof that our presuppositions often predetermine the histories we reconstruct, even to the point of how we filter data from narratives.
Brian,
I am trying very hard not to presuppose any particular explanation. I think it entirely plausible that the miracle stories originated with actual eyewitnesses who saw Jesus do things that they were unable to explain. On the other hand, I also think it plausible that someone could have become a Christian without access to authentic stories about the earthly Jesus–e.g., as a result of Paul’s preaching–and that such a person might attribute supernatural acts to Jesus when he preached the gospel to others.
My question is whether there is some objective criteria which would justify a historian in assigning a higher probability to the former than the latter.
I don’t think there is an “objective” criteria. I think we have options of plausibility. I find it more plausible that Jesus did deeds that were interpreted as miraculous, so many that it became a staple part of how people described him. I think it is less plausible that these stories were myths detached from his actual actions.
One point would be how Matthew cleans up some of Mark’s stories, such as the healing where Jesus has to try twice because the blind man saw “men as trees” first. The raw detail of this story seems like an odd thing to make up out of the blue.
“My question is whether there is some objective criteria which would justify a historian in assigning a higher probability to the former than the latter.”
Vinny, my answer is no. For one thing – and forgive me Earth for being mathematical here – there’s no comparing “probabilities” unless they’re measurable, and since we have no sizable collection of data on cases of “the former”, nor of “the latter”, then there is no way to compare “probability”.
The fact that many professional NT critics and apologists have apparently ignored this mathematical truth probably helped them all greatly when constructing their arguments for whichever position.
Please note, however, I also say that both groups are equally unjustified, imho. In other words, miracles – being by definition both implausible and anomalous – cannot be common enough to gather large sets of data about, nor for the accurate reporting of them to be considered “probable”. This much should be obvious, and yet the improbable cannot be equated with the impossible.
So, if we can’t prove it, and we can’t disprove it, then what the heck is everyone fighting about?
That’s *my* question, Vinny. Are people fighting to convince one another, really? Or are people just fighting to hold onto their own cherished positions about certainty itself? More and more, I suspect it’s the latter. (Though your question, above, I sincerely took as an honest inquiry, fwiw.)
Brian,
I think that factors like that may objectively point towards one particular possibility although I’m doubtful that they are sufficient to eliminate others.
Bill,
I’m not sure whether I cherish my position of uncertainty or not (sometimes it’s annoying), although my inquiry was honest and I appreciate you treating it as such.
You’re “not sure” if you cherish “uncertainty”? If we were already good friends, Vinny, I’d LOL here about that. 😉
For there to be certainty about the objective truth behind subjective history, we do not need probability.
Consider this infinite sequence:
1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + 1/32 + ……
I guarantee you, no one has ever summed that infinite sequence, (or they would still be summing). Do we say … ‘It probably equals 1’ .. or ‘we need to determine the probability it equals 1’? Does this series ‘probably’ converge or ‘converge absolutely’?
The above series converges absolutely and is a well known type of Geometric series. If we cannot ‘actually’ sum its infinite components, how can we know with certainty it absolutely converges? This is the same question we are asking ‘how can we know history’. Would we doubt WW1 because we cannot know with certainty that each of its witness were being truthful, honest, and accurate?
A guy name Kurt Gödel proved that within a self-consistent system of reason, not all ‘truths’ will be provable (The Incompleteness Theorem). This means that just because we cannot prove something to be true DOES NOT MEAN it is NOT TRUE.
We should not confuse the ontological nature of something with its epistemological nature. It is possible to have ontological certainty without having epistemological certainty as long as we posses warrant. (We don’t need to actually step off the Empire State Building tower to believe we’ll perish if we do)
Probability is Math. Hooray, Math!
(By which I mean, I think Andrew is correct.)
@Bill: 🙂
I would say this about the logic in that post:
About Note (1): The probability of a dead body returning to life is virtually and effectively nil.
This premise is true if and only iff ‘returning to life’ is a ‘natural’ event. However, if the biblical view has a dead body returning to life ‘supra-naturally’ the certainty of this premise changes. The same is true of Note (2).
If we distinguish between what is ‘natural’ and what is ‘supernatural’ (Note 3) is actually false. We can be certain life does not come from non-life, and the dead stay dead and we also have a basis for measuring the probability of such testimony. However, Note 3 is ONLY true when we allow for supernatural intervention.
If God exists there is no mathematical basis for measuring the “probability” of whether such testimony may be true or untrue.
The problem most believers make in assessing the testimony of the resurrection, is that they automatically discount supernatural intervention (without warrant) due to their presuppositions. Thus the only basis they have for gauging resurrection is through natural means.
To speak of God now you’ve left Math and gone to Philosophy, which is fine, but it doesn’t contradict my point in ‘note 3’. Previously it sounded like you’ve had some Calculus and studied the concept of Limits, so I assumed you’d recognize the relationship between probability and statistics.
Quantifiable estimates of Probability work with things like coins, cards, roulette, the lottery, etc. To introduce God into any estimate obviously changes ALL bets because we cannot predict how likely GOD is to do *anything*. The point I was making in ‘note 3’ would apply as easily to any unverifiable reports of incredible occurrences.
If my son told me he saw a small bird fly down, snatch up and fly off with a large snake, I’d be skeptical, and ‘probably’ (based on my personal belief trends) I would suspect that his estimation was off, but I could neither verify his report scientifically, nor could I assess the mathematical probability that such a unique event would have occurred.
(Brian, I hope this doesn’t totally hijack the thread. That was not my intention.)
@Bill:
I’ve horribly mess up that last line. It should have read:
The problem most NON-believers make in assessing the testimony of the resurrection, is that they automatically discount supernatural intervention (without warrant) due to their presuppositions. Thus, TO THE NON-BELIEVER, the only basis they have for gauging resurrection is through natural means.
(changes in CAPS)
Even so, the point I was making is that in using ‘probability’ you have to qualify its use WRT to ‘natural’ or ‘supernatural’. I agree with the conclusion of the post, but believe the premises (and therefore the conclusions) must also be qualified to be true.
I think we are saying the same thing about Note 3. Because of God Note (3) is true – and I certainly agree. This is the same as “without God, Note (3) is false. I can see how you’re using that on unverifiable reports or incredible occurrences (when such things are seen to further God’s purpose).
(… and yes, I have some understanding of Calculus, as well as modular math and probability theory)
Andrew, I don’t think we agree at all. There’s no theology in math. My post was about the difference between assessing verified events versus assessing reports of unverified events. IOW, “What is the probability that something occurred?” is much different than “What is the probability that so-and-so lied?”. My contention was merely that the later case requires a separate but nonexistent data set, thus rendering its ‘probability’ incalculable.
Back to Brian’s actual post. Near the end, Brian wrote: “What can we verify? We can suggest that there is a strong probability that followers of Jesus saw him do things that they could not explain that they attributed to the work of God. This is an interpretation of the events though. At best, we know Jesus did dto cause people to see him as a miracle worker. I don’t know if doing history allows one to makes claims that God did this or that.”
I still say we can’t verify anything miraculous. On the other hand, we have testimony that claims such events did occur. As Brian said, one can interpret that testimony as confused attempts to explain the mysterious, OR, as I feel is equally valid for historical work, one can accept that testimony as unverifiable fact. Yes, Jesus did some strange stuff, and ONE possible explanation of how people perceived that strange stuff is to posit that things happened exactly as was perceived. That is a historical interpretation of the text perfectly admissible for further analysis. The only problem there is that conservatives don’t want to continue analysis; they just want to defend historicity. Tragic, really.
On Brian’s question about God’s actions, I push the question to our primary sources. If the source itself claims “that God did this or that”, then I contend the same way as above. As testimony of an unverifiable supernatural occurrence, it may be valid to accept that testimony and then go on to further historical analysis and reconstruction of related occurrences. As with all historiography, anything we say beyond that point is hypothetical. So, as I keep saying, why deny anyone the chance?
The conservative approach to ‘Historical Jesus’ studies is hopelessly mired in debating historicity. Meanwhile, Crossan, Borg, Tabor et al have done some creative but plausible work. Again, IFF the supernatural claims are bogus, then these guys are doing remarkably helpful studies, albeit producing contradictory reconstructions. One challenge for the conservative historiography of the future will be to see how diverse *our* reconstructions might be.
Christendom’s heinously divided across theological lines of interpretation. I wonder if the same will hold true once we finally embrace historiography. I honestly do have some hope that it won’t be nearly as bad…
@Bill: Ok, you say “I still say we can’t verify anything miraculous.” This begs the larger question being discussed can we verify anything in the past (either supernatural or otherwise)?.
I say we don’t need (verify anything) to (where ‘verify’ needs to defined).
I have no problem with you saying we can’t verify anything miraculous. I agree, ‘miraculous’ falls outside of the normal range of repeatable observability – but then so are ‘historical events’ (despite pithy sayings about ‘being condemned to repeat history’, we cannot, strictly speaking, repeat history (which means recreate the conditions perfectly to have it happen again). How does one distinguish ‘verifiable events’ from ‘non-verifiable events’?
I would argue all historical events are formally non-verifiable (being in the past), but that does not make them false, nor does it mean we cannot be certain about them. In my mind, the boundary lies in the fact these events in the past. On the other hand, you seem to draw the boundary around whether or not they were supernatural. Where-ever we draw the boundary – I believe we lump them into the same category, though not for the same reason perhaps.
It was against this endless habit of debating historicity I was objecting. Historicity has become an excuse for denying truth due to subjective relativism. I reject the view ‘that because our presuppositions flavour our understandings’ we cannot ‘know’ history. We know, for example WW2 happened (this is it’s ontological nature). Further, we know some things with certainty; The British fought the Germans; Americans fought the Japanese; etc.) We don’t know precisely everything that happened, or why, but this defect is merely an epistemological defect.
There are some records which seem verified by corroborating accounts, or by physical artifacts, but of course you are right. What I’m saying is that especially incredible testimony is especially unverifiable.
In focusing specifically on the supernatural, my point is that it’s perfectly fair to focus on the aspect of testimony, as opposed to the aspect of nature.
A very interesting topic with very interesting answers! I know it’s been a few months, but I’d just like to throw my two cents and see if anyone else responds to address some points.
IMO it is very clear that at least some of the miracles are pure misrepresentations mixed with actual events the viewers did not understand. By this I mean that all miracles can be attributed to legitimate healing, illusion such as what one would see at a modern-day magic show, and popular misconceptions.
Things like the healings can either be attributed to Jesus using valid methods of healing that were not fully recorded (his mixture of spit and mud for the blind man, probably with a concoction of herbs not recorded, being an example of an old medicine man method) or they were simply faith healings as can still be witnessed by Peter Popoff and Kearney Thomas. Perhaps it was a mixture of both.
The exorcisms can still be witnessed by people who believe in such things to this day, so either everyone before and after Jesus was just doing the same old and he somehow was actually doing it, or they are all doing the same thing (which I’m pretty sure reasonable people have come to disbelieve in modern times). Considering even Christian representations of the exorcisms make them look very dubious, I would suspect that they were mostly if not all simply accounts of people having epileptic seizures or other such disorders and the cesation of their fits attributed to the words of whoever took the initiative to say them at the right time. Many of these types of healings are so poorly documented it seems we cannot even make an alternate analysis, so it’s also here possible that a mixture of legitimate healing and superstitious misconception formed these stories.
The nature-controlling miracles are also mostly misconception, such as the calming of the storm and the feeding of the thousands, or plain magical illusions such as turning water to wine and getting a coin from a fish’s mouth. Even the transfiguration just reads like the disciples did some psycho-active drugs, not unlike what happens almost everyday to people. Jesus’ face glowing and the others hearing voices and seeing people who aren’t there is all just too much of a coincidence for drugs to not be an option.
Finally, we get to the resurrections. With Jarius’ daughter it seems clear that the people misunderstood what happened (he says the girl isn’t dead and tells her to get up, when she does they proclaim it a miraculous resurrection). The resurrection at Nain and of Lazarus are both harder to explain: either Jesus actually brought these people back to life (which is rather unlikely as it’s impossible and he was very selective about who he resurrected), or they were accomplices of Jesus who worked with him to give the illusion of resurrecting. Considering the Lazarus was his good friend this seems plausible. It would also explain why he didn’t resurrect anyone else. (But himself of course, another instance where it seems his accomplices in the form of Nicodemus and the “angels” at the tomb were able to create the illusion of resurrecting.)
I guess what I’m trying to say is, given all the accounts and squaring them up with common sense, doesn’t it seem likely that Jesus was more of a magician/medicine-man than mainstream Christianity seems willing to admit? He had many other disciples that are hardly mentioned at all, and when you think like a magician you begin to see that things like healing the man blind from birth, cursing the fig tree to have it die later, water to wine, performing miraculous healings at very specific moments to make specific points (such as the woman with the withered hand, the paralytic at Capernaum or Lazarus), are all very easily done with a little bit of accomplice work. The only reason this seems to work is that, if accepted, the position that Jesus was a magician/medicine-man squares quite well with other accounts of similar people, explains just about every event logically and rationally (even the misrepresentations of other “miracles”), and virtually ends all squabling that results from trying to use reason to defend unreasonable suppositions. If we accept this position we can both do away with the disagreements over historical accuracy and focus on the MESSAGE of Jesus (inheriting Eternal Life through accepting the Good News of the Kingdom of Heaven by becoming Jesus’ Disciple and following his commands) instead of the miracles he apparently did. In fact, the practice of using magic to preach the Gospel is still used by so-called gospel magicians who call their illusions “visual parables”. Was Jesus too merely performing visual parables that some understood and others didn’t?
So does this sound reasonable or is it just the most blasphemous thing I could have said?