Recently I have argued that the academic study of the Bible is best served by a commitment to historicism not because our methods are objective and free of bias, but because this approach provides the best checks-and-balances for discussing the Bible in a context that isn’t shaped by religious commitment (see “Historiography, historical method, ‘the past,’ and biblical studies”). Let me be clear, I am not saying one can fully bracket their faith commitments when approaching the text, but that is part of the aim of doing good historical work. There are some who suggest that this approach is essentially “modernistic,” and I understand the point that they are making, especially if someone suggest that their methods allow them to be objective researchers. But we should confuse the desire to correctly narrate past events with modernism.
I was reminded of this while reading the first part of Josephus’ The Wars of the Jews where he says that his work is meant to be different than those who write “either out of a humor of flattery to the Romans, or of hatred towards the Jews (Preface, 1).” Essentially, Josephus is saying that these others who recorded events did so with a heavy bias. He aims to correct them. As students of Josephus are aware he is bias as well and that proves my point in another sense: no one is free of bias. Yet it should be observed that the very pre-modern Josephus was quite concerned with “setting the record straight” if you will.
Josephus continues his critique saying, “It is true, these writers have the confidence to call their accounts histories; wherein yet they seem to me to fail of their own purpose, as well as to relate nothing that is sound; for they have a mind to demonstrate the greatness of the Romans, while they still diminish and lessen the actions of the Jews…(Preface, 2). Again, not modernist objectivity, but an effort to tell the story correctly and to avoid the particular blind spots of others. Josephus claims to be able to avoid their mistakes writing, “However, I will not go to the other extreme, out of opposition to those men who extol the Romans, nor will I determine to raise the actions of my countrymen too high; but I will prosecute the actions of both parties with accuracy (Preface, 4).”
What is quite amazing about Josephus is he does go on to remind his readers that these events have impacted him emotionally. It was his people who were overrun and his nation that was destroyed. He reminds his readers that he must be allowed to “indulge some lamentations upon the miseries undergone by my own country (Preface, 4).”
Anyways, one can quickly read through the Preface to Wars to understand what I am saying. It is helpful to remember that a concern for truth and accuracy isn’t a modernist problem. Sure, there are modernist elements to our current historical work that make us different from folk like Josephus, but the pursuit of truth is usually the same even if the rules are slightly altered at times.
the archives near Emmaus 
Brian said “It is helpful to remember that a concern for truth and accuracy isn’t a modernist problem.”
True.
You also make an excellent argument that transparency and convention in the historical method serves as a counterbalance against bias. That bias exists doesn’t mean a commitment to historicism isn’t useful; just as the experience of ‘one blind man and an elephant’ doesn’t mean we cannot know the elephant. That Josephus was able to write, and contribute, to the study of history even with his own bias, in the backdrop of the bias’ of Roman historians means Josephus view off-setting the Roman view, has contributed to the making of an ‘objective’ history.
People constantly seem to fall for that sceptical fallacy that relative knowledge cannot contribute to the construction of objectivity. Relative knowledge taken against the collective norm (of a population) is objective. This is why the Gospel must have many proclaimers. The Gospel taught by one may be false, but the Gospel Christ bequeathed to his people is a collective norm discussed, written, proclaimed (and it is objective) [2 Peter 1:20-21].
Thanks for this Brian. I agree with your sense that we want to be able to reach an agreed idea of history that avoids the excesses and inaccuracies that come from particular biases. But thinking about this further, could it not be that our goal is to have a right bias, rather than to avoid bias? Could this not be what Josephus was attempting to do – to do history with a good and godly set of prejudices, rather than deceitful prejudices?
I guess I have an eye on the NT writers when I say this – it seems to me that when they consider OT history (e.g. in Stephen’s speech in Acts, or Paul’s conception of Abraham, or Peter’s Pentecost sermon), there is no way that they would think it appropriate to bracket religious commitment. Rather, they have perceived that the right “prejudice” with which to approach God’s OT prophetic word is via his ultimate Word, Jesus Christ.
Interested in your thoughts,
Matt
Matthew
Good point, I agree that there are good prejudices. I would say a theistic outlook is better than an atheistic one and I would say that a Christian theistic outlook is better than a generic theistic one. That said, there is a sense in which the prejudice against accepting supernatural explanations when participating in a discourse that is asking naturalistic questions only may be a good idea. If I were talking to a Muslim about the history of his religions origins I would be open to him telling me about his personal/theological/experiential reasons for believing in the inspiration of the Quran, but there may be a context (like an academic conference) where we would both benefit from assuming naturalistic presuppositions for the purpose of that unique form of discourse.
This is why I am personally perplexed when it comes to thinking about Licona’s book on the resurrection or Keener’s books on miracles: I share their worldview. That said, I don’t know that I would argue for using their presuppositions at a conference like SBL because of the nature of the discourse and the agreed upon “rules” of the game. This is not to say that critical historical method is universally true or somehow objective, but for academic history to “work” some presuppositions have to be set aside in given venues.
So day-to-day, I try not to bracket my religious commitment, but in some venues I think it is necessary. Personally I believe the resurrection occurred, and I think there are good reasons for believing this, but I don’t think we can “prove” it through historical critical study. That doesn’t mean it didn’t happen. It means historical methods are limited when having this type of discourse in particular settings.
Thoughts?
Yeah, I absolutely agree that we can’t prove the resurrection through historical critical study. And so I agree that if the discussion is about the veracity of the resurrection, then it has to remain agnostic in such a setting. But I suppose that we need to understand that the severe limitation placed on our knowledge of history by this methodology finds a parallel severe limitation on our interpretation of texts: Just as historical critical methodologies can only take us so far in terms of the veracity of the resurrection (they can test the accompanying data for consistency, etc.), so they can only take us so far in terms of gaining the ‘meaning’ of biblical texts. So I don’t disagree that in certain contexts, our discussion needs to be limited. I just lament the extent to which this limitation robs us of a full engagement with the text.
One comment Brian, you said “… but I don’t think we can “prove” it through historical critical study” (meaning the resurrection) – why not?
If the resurrection was a historical event, and we affirm (or deny) the truth other other historical events using the critical historical method (as you say), why exclude the resurrection from the same analysis?
(If it’s because the resurrection would be impossible ‘naturally’ and the ONLY way the resurrection could be true was with the metaphysical involvement of a supernatural being – that is a bias, and one that should not go unchallenged. Simply because science restricts itself to the physical world does not mean that we can reason about and speak sensibly of the metaphysical word. Logic and mathematics, which science presupposes, does this all the time. If historical evidence points in the direction of metaphysics, the historian should not be prohibited from doing what the scientist already does, and takes for granted.)
Matthew
I agree. In a recent blog conversation with another blogger “Bryce Walker” I tried to advocate a both-and approach. In some situations the rules of the game demand that we limit what we can say, but that doesn’t mean there is no place for theological readings of the text.
Andrew
I say this because most historians assume a naturalistic methodology. They don’t have a “God of the gaps” allowance for things we can’t explain naturally. As Matthew said above, someone can have their personal opinion on the resurrection, but the historical method cannot address whether Jesus rose from the dead because of the agreed upon presuppositions within the academy. This doesn’t mean it didn’t happen or that there isn’t good reasons to conclude that it did, but merely that it is so unique our naturalistic approach can’t “reach” it.
Brian, I agree this is the case, but I’m asking why should we not question it?
Scientist study the physical university, but do not confine their thinking to the physical university. For example they appeal to Calculus which presupposes metaphysics (No one has actually ever summed an infinite sequence for example, yet they must presuppose this is possible to use calculus).
So it seems hypocritical for historians to have to presuppose an atheistic position. It isn’t ‘God of the gaps’ if the evidence suggests something more.
If the evidence points to Jesus’ resurrection, and we are unable to find a naturalistic/physical explanation, the problem is with our methodology. When mathematics realized that no one would actually sum an infinite sequence, i.e. the evidence pointed to something not supported by nature, they presupposed a metaphysical solution in the ‘Continuous function’ which generalized an infinite (but countable) sequence of discrete components, into an infinite (but uncountable) sequence of infinite components. This is instrumental to the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus.
So again, if scientists can appeal to metaphysics, why can’t historians (when the evidence suggests this is necessary)? It seems to me, the presupposition you need to be an atheist to be a historian is simply bunk and unwarranted. Don’t you think we should question this?
Andrew
I wouldn’t say it is a hypocritical. It could be considered humble. If a historian asserts that God could not have raised Jesus from the dead this is a philosophical/theological assertion. If a historian says that historical method cannot addressed questions like this one then they are being honest about limitations.
We have to ask ourselves what our history books would look like if we told people to insert their theological views where they can’t explain things. Do we want long chapters on God helping George Washington defeat the British? Theoretically possible, but problematic for recounting history. What if in a future a Muslim American writes about the recent political upheaval in Egypt and he decides to give several paragraphs to Allah’s sovereignty. Again, he has the right to his belief, and he may have good reasons for believing these things, but do we want to include our theology into our history? I think there could be problems.
Humble – yes .. but hypocritical too. The methodology is imposing upon itself a standard even science doesn’t adhere to.
Given you’re recent discussion about methodologies, I was speaking more to methodology (than the profession of being a historian). It need not be historians venturing beyond naturalism. Perhaps it could be biblical scholars aware of the historical method, but unconstrained by it.
Your example of the resurrection is a good one. I agree that to a historian, the resurrection cannot be explained (because there is no natural explanation), but does that mean the question ends there? The theologian says there is a God. Believe in God is rational (life coming from non-life; reason coming from the irrational; order in the universe from dis-order, and universes creating themselves are all irrational), so if the Historical method cannot explain something the Historian should absolutely look elsewhere.
The objection you raise is a good one, but just because there is diversity of opinion doesn’t mean we shouldn’t ask the questions and pose the answers. Metaphyiscs like physics is rational. Some (metaphysical) explanations are more rational than others, and metaphysical truth can also be arrived at through observation
The mathematician noticed for example that the more countable but discrete components in an infinite sequence one added, the clearly the behaviour of the sequence appeared, thus it was rational to conclude a continuous function ‘functioned’ (pardon the pun) similarly to the infinite sequence and their behaviour could be explained – this against those who said infinities could not be added. It was therefore ‘rational’ to make decisions about metaphysical properties.
Presuming appeals are made about Egypt’s current upheaval to Allah, again I see no reason this can’t be done rationally either. That there are different world views in collision, does not mean one is not correct. But simply avoiding asking the question is intellectual dishonest and a concession to the atheistic world view that it is correct and reasonable.
Andrew
It seems to depend on the “location” of biblical studies. Sure, in an environment that is apologetical or in an environment where Christian scholars meet with Christian scholars the move from historical method to theology is fair game. In an environment where “biblical studies” is done under the umbrella of historical method there needs to be a way of preventing people from saying any thing about the past or proposing any idea that comes to mind (e.g., aliens built the pyramids in Egypt) so I support naturalistic methodology as a limitation in say, for example, a SBL meeting.
AndrewT: Because historians are not trained to deal with metaphysical claims, and neither are those in the natural sciences— your example taken from mathematics doesn’t work because aspects of the mathematics end up being more philosophical, i.e. is a number an abstract object or a physical object? For a historian to deal adequately with miracles, he would have to literally establish a metaphysics in the front of each of his articles/books in order to establish the superiority of the Christian ‘evidence’ cover that of the competing worldviews…and it ain’t goi’n to happen…..they are not equipped philosophically to do so. Historians have attempted to insert religious claims, i.e. Robert Orsi, but their explanations always lack in where to draw the line and what to allow. And this would not be just a problem with Christianity vs. religion X, it would even fluctuate within Christianity: Catholic visions (which Protestants usually don’t like), the view that believes miracles, prophecy, etc. was only something that occurred in the age of the apostles vs. those who believe they happen now…. it would become a royal nightmare for historians to deal with each claim.
What it depends on is dialogue, and reason. ‘Location’ is only a code-word for isolation. I don’t know SBL or their cultural rules – so if that is a constraint of SBL .. fair enough. If a naturalistic methodology is a constraint of a cultural convention, I can agree.
I was more arguing against it being a defacto necessary presupposition to a rational approach to history. If historians (by convention) want to restrict their thinking about history to a narrow subset of thinking – then they cannot claim a monopoly on the study of history.
I don’t think historians monopolize the study of history, but they do have rules by which they must abide to do history academically. There is no one saying that people can’t publish books on the resurrection that mix history with theology–they exist.
betweenathensandjerusalem:
I don’t deny ‘mathematics’ is philosophical. Of course mathematics is philosophical, mathematics presupposes philosophy, and arose out of it (remember the Pythagoras theorem? Philosophy!) That doesn’t invalidate my position or mathematics. But that was kind of my point.
Theology (and philosophy) are foundational fields, necessary for all others. Historically, philosophy and theology were indistinguishable until relatively recently. That distinction may just be arbitrary (the distinction being the outcome of existentialism, so a product of atheism. Since atheistic existentialism is dead theology and philosophy appear to be coming back together).
But again, a historian doesn’t need to be the one dealing with miracles. But the historian also doesn’t need to presuppose the are impossible, if some other field provides a rational explanation for them. Right now, the historian is compelled (because of a commitment to atheism) to rejection the notion of miracles. But if they happen, and if there is a rational explanation for how or why they happen – that is simply irrational for a historian to reject them then – even if she isn’t the one to explain them.
You note however, that a historian may not be equipped philosophically to explain miracles – and I agree. But the defect of some particular historian need not necessarily impose a constraint on the field, or on human reason. If Historians need to pick up philosophy to equip them to see the full spectrum of history – so be it.
Brian – specialization will be the death of human thinking …
Ok….
Ok that was a BIT categorical ..
… I affirm that specialization will be the death of human thinking .. if it hasn’t already been.
AndrewT: Historians, unless they are atheists, do not presuppose miracles are impossible…. they presuppose that they are out of the realm of the academic historian to deal with, because like a scientist, they presuppose a methodological naturalism (rather than a metaphysical)— same reasons why historians in their work, do not condemn actions like slavery. Let the theologians/philosophers provide the meaning to the event– just as the Jews ascribed God to the rise and fall of Babylon. “Picking up philosophy to see the full spectrum of history,” is rather simplistic, as it presupposes within that statement (maybe not your intentions) that just being a philosopher means you will now believe in miracles….No, instead what you’ll have is the atheist historian-philosophers arguing for the closed universe and the theist ones arguing for the open universe, and then any sort of book review or panel discussion will be focused upon those topics rather than the actual historical data that should be the focus at a historical society meeting. It is hard enough to determine and decide the natural causes within the events of the past.
AndrewT: Look, it is fine if you want historians to adequately deal with miracles and the supernatural. But, you’re going to have to establish new historical methodologies to do so, you’re going to have to change the historiography of modern history. And again, that is fine, but first get your PhD in history/philosophy, and then make that a dissertation, and go defend it at the various historical societies. Until then, historians will remain as they are, and the theologians can provide the value-meaning to the work of the historians.
betweenathensandjerusalem said:
“… same reasons why historians in their work, do not condemn actions like slavery.”
I’m not sure I entirely agree with that. I’m sure most socialist historians identifying class struggle historically do so with the tone of condemnation. I don’t think historians do, as a matter of course, remove the influence of their world-view from their thinking, save perhaps for theistic historians.
I agree, we are talking a new methodological approach (preferably one that doesn’t require you to presuppose naturalism) – though I’m not sure it is necessarily one for the historian specifically as Brian pointed out.
AndrewT: This is going to get hot and heavy quick into historiography, which is rich and complex, but we’ll ignore that for now….you can read some stuff on my blog that I’ve written about historical methodology—see if it clears anything up. Historians are supposed to approach their work objectively, leaving their personal biases aside, at least to the best of our abilities. Historians generally refrain, in their academic work, from judging the past in a ‘value’ sort of way. They simply explain what happened… does that mean historians do not ever take off their historian hat sometimes to say “ya this guy was an idiot,” no of course not. I am sure you could find something like that somewhere, but keep in mind that in that moment, he ceases to be a historian. Good example of this sort of balance would be Protestant, Catholic, Jew– where Jewish sociologist Will Herberg writes as a sociologist for all but the last chapter, where he puts on his Jewish theologian hat.
Clearly I am quite late to the party, but this bothered me too much to not leave a comment: “but the pursuit of truth is usually the same even if the rules are slightly altered at times.”
This sounds like a “the ends justify the means” remark. I most certainly do not agree. Those rules of which you speak are there to help ensure that we actually reach the truth in our pursuit. Do you not agree to that? If you don’t, how can you not? Do you not think that those who wrote “either out of a humor of flattery to the Romans, or of hatred towards the Jews,” to quote your quote of Josephus, were also pursuing truth? Or at least thought they were? Perhaps they weren’t, but it would not surprise me if they did indeed too think they were pursuing truth. Yet, it would seem the “truth” they discovered was quite different from what Josephus discovered. And, thus, the need for rules.